In order to redefine and strengthen aspects of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin made a joint in-flight statement between strategic and non-strategic (theatrical) missile defence systems. Russia ratified the agreement in May 2000, but the measure was never sent to the U.S. Senate. The withdrawal of President George W. Bush from the ABM in June 2002 renders the agreement insignificant. Many leading nuclear arms control experts, including George Shultz, Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, have called on Mr. Trump to stay the treaty.  Gorbachev criticized Trump`s exit from the nuclear deal as “not the work of a great spirit” and called it “a new arms race.”  The decision was criticized by the chairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees, who said that the Trump administration had offered Putin a simple way out of the treaty and had made the game in hand instead of drawing up a plan to hold Russia to account and push it to play by the rules.  Similar arguments had already been made on 25 October 2018 by European NATO members, who urged the United States to “try to bring Russia back in accordance with the treaty rather than put it in place to avoid a split of the alliance that Moscow could exploit”.  The INF Treaty is seen as an innovative next-generation agreement, which has served as an example for subsequent arms control contracts such as START I and CFE. It eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons and for the first time put in place comprehensive verification and data exchange mechanisms, including on-site inspections. The on-site inspection office was created and responsible for the audit tasks of the NSF.
The U.S. Senate passes the Nunn-Lugar Act, which defines the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The Programme will provide financial and technical assistance to the states of the former USSR for the security and dismantling of nuclear weapons and fissile material; to remove thousands of warheads from their territories; and employ nuclear scientists in civilian jobs. Since 1991, the CTR program has received more than $5.9 billion in defence credits per year. In May 1992, the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I agreement, in which they expressed their intention to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. In his State of the Union address on 28 January, US President George Bush proposed a further reduction of strategic weapons to an unspecified limit (4,700 warheads) on the condition that all MIRVED ICBMs be eliminated altogether. As part of such an agreement, it promised to reduce the number of warheads at Minuteman ICBMs by one third, reduce the number of warheads on SLBMs by one third from the original SLBM force I, and transform “a substantial portion” of “mainly conventional” heavy bombers. It also announced a unilateral decision to end the B-2 program for 20 heavy bombers instead of the 75 previously planned, cancel the small ICBM program, stop the production of new warheads for SLBMs and stop the purchase of other advanced cruise missiles. For nearly five decades, Washington and Moscow have been in talks to manage their nuclear competition. These negotiations resulted in a series of acronyms – SALT, INF, START – for arms control agreements that strengthened strategic stability, reduced inflated nuclear arsenals and had a positive impact on broader bilateral relations. On the most abstract level, a look back at the history of U.S. Soviet and Russian armaments control assessments of compliance offers a window of change in geopolitical concerns and priorities, as the pendulum shifts from compliance issues related to high-power rivalry (the focus on reports in the 1980s), to a focus on non-proliferation and threats from a wide range of states (which emerged as a new theme in the 1980s).
1990s) and then, again, to some extent, the rivalry of